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CIVIL PROCEDURE: NEW JERSEY ADOPTS STANDARDS
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN GRANTING
IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS
TO NONRESIDENT LITIGANTS
THE doctrine exempting nonresidents from service of civil process
while in the state for the purpose of attending trial has roots in the
English common law as early as the reign of Henry VI.1 In the
United States, most jurisdictions adopted the doctrine with only
such modifications as were required to make it harmonize with
American institutions and jurisprudence.2 However, many excep-
tions to the basic rule gradually developed,3 and in recent years the
rule itself has come under attack.4 In Wangler v. Harvey,5 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey abandoned its old rule of immunity
for nonresident litigants and adopted a more flexible approach to
the problem.
Tie defendant, a resident of New York, was in New jersey "to
defend a suit instituted against him as executor of his father's estate
which was located in New Jersey. 6 While standing outside the court-
room, the defendant was served with a summons and complaint in
the instant action which named him as a defendant in his individual
capacity
42 AM. JUR. Process § 139, at 120 (1942); '21 R.C.L. Process § 52, at 1307:08
(1929). See also Hatch v. Blissett, 13 Annae 308, 93 Eng. Rep. 338 (1714). "'
242'A7. Jut. Process § 139, at 120 (1942);' 21 R.C.L. Prodess § 52, at 1307-08 (1929).
See, e.g., Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. (3 Bdy&e) 1, 79 At. 790 (1911); Sofge v.
Lowe, 131 Tenn. 626, 176 S.W. 106 (1915):-
8 See generally 42 Am. Jut. Process §§ 139-44 (1942); 72 CJ.S. Process § 80 (a) (2)
(1951).
4 See, e.g., Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S.W.2d 127 (1933); Keeffe &
Roscia, Immunity and Sentimentality, 32 COwNELL L.Q. '471 (1947). Cf. Velkov v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d 25 (1953); Kitley v. Chamberlin, 250 Iowa
136, 93 N.V.2d 80 (1958); Eberlin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 402 Pa. 520, 167 A.2d 155
(1961); 1 BEALE, THE CONFLicT OF LAWS § 78.5, at 342 (1935); Developients in the
Law-State-Court jurisdiction, 73 HtARV. L. REv. 909, 941 (1960)..
'141 N.J. 277, 196 A.2d 513 (1963).
" Service of process in the suit had been made upon the Surrogate. Under the
requirements of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:12-14 (1953), a nonresident executor must file
a power of attorney with the Surrogate making him agent for substituted service of
process in any action against the estate.
' Both actions arose from an accident which allegedly occurred on premises owned
by the father at the time of his death and devised to the defendant and another subject
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The trial court granted a motion by the defendant to quash
service of process on the ground that as a nonresident he was immune
from such service.8 The Supreme Court, granting certification on
its own motion, reversed and remanded the case for trial.9
In doing so, the court held that the long-standing rule of im-
munity was an anachronism, "wholly inconsistent with today's con-
cept of justice." 10  Rejecting the old rule, the court adopted a
modified approach under which the principles of forum non con-
veniens govern the granting of immunity to a nonresident litigant
served with process within the state. Although nonresident wit-
nesses apparently still have the protection of the old rule,1' granting
of immunity to nonresident litigants, under the holding in this case,
is to be considered an exception rather than standard practice. The
moving party shall have the burden of making an affirmative show-
ing of a violation of the traditional concepts of fair play and sub-
stantial justice before dismissal will be justified.12
Under the early common law, the privilege of immunity was ap-
plicable only to residents of a jurisdiction.18 Later it was extended
to nonresidents and was finally limited to include only the latter.
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States hold that litigants,
to an intermediate life estate. Defendant, in his capacity as executor, had contacted
plaintiff, a real estate broker, to arrange for the sale of the land. While defendant was
showing the property to plaintiff, the alleged accident occurred. Plaintiff thus sought
to hold both the estate and the individual defendant liable for the alleged negligence.
196 A.2d at 513.
s Defendant relied on Halsey v. Stewart, 4 N.J.L. 426 (Sup. Ct. 1817), which held
that a party to a suit, while necessarily going to, staying at, or returning from the
court, is privileged from service of process. Accord, Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222
(1932); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Dungan v. Miller, 37 N.J.L. 182
(Sup. Ct. 1874); Grober v. Kahn, 76 N.J. Super. 252, 184 A.2d 161 (Ch. Div. 1962);
Randall v. Randall, 14 N.J. Super. 110, 81 A.2d 400 (Ch. Div. 1951); Younger v.
Younger, 5 N.J. Super. 371, 69 A.2d 219 (App. Div. 1949); Herman v. Arndt, 116
N.J.L. 150, 182 At. 830 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936). Cf. Korff v. G & G Corp., 21 N.J.
558, 122 A.2d 889 (1956).
OThe plaintiff appealed the decision of the Law Division to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division. However, that appeal was never argued, for it was immediately
certified to the Supreme Court.
10 196 A.2d at 516-17.
The court noted with approval Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I. 304, 307, 15 At.
83, 84 (1888) where it was stated: "'While we concede the force of the reasons advanced
for protecting non-resident witnesses from the service of a summons against them for
the commencement of a suit... we are not convinced of the sufficiency of the reasons
assigned for the exemption of non-resident suitors from such process.'" 196 A.2d at
516. (Emphasis added.)
12 196 A.2d at 518.
23 In its inception, the exemption was from arrest but was subsequently enlarged
to encompass all forms of civil process. 21 R.C.L. Process § 52 (1929).
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whether plaintiffs or defendants, and witnesses in attendance at a
court outside the territorial jurisdiction of their residence are im-
mune from service of process while attending court.14 The tendency,
however, has been to modify this rule with the result that the im-
munity does not apply to process issued in the very cause for which
the person entered the jurisdiction or in another cause which is in
aid of, incidental to, or connected with the original suit.15 In a
minority of jurisdictions, under no circumstances are nonresident
litigants entitled to immunity.' 6 Some jurisdictions, combining
aspects of both rules, extend immunity to nonresident defendants
but withhold it from nonresident plaintiffs.'1  A few jurisdictions
intimate that even the nonresident defendant's immunity is limited
to certain circumstances.' 8
Originally, the exemption was a privilege of the courts, but today
the benefit of the rule inures to individuals as well.' 9 The doctrine
was developed in order to prevent interruptions and delay in judicial
proceedings and to protect witnesses and parties from the tempta-
tion to disobey the process of the courts.20  In addition, several more
specific considerations have been suggested 2' as foundations of the
rule: (1) the necessity of having courts open with protection for all
who approach them; 22 (2) the necessity of' the maintenance of the
1 This privilege also extends for a reasonable time while the person is going to
or returning from the court. See generally 72 C.J.S. Process § 80 (a) (2) (1951).
1Ibid. See also Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hitchcock, 158 F. Supp. 783
(E.D. Mo. 1958); Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d 25 (1953);
Kirtley v. Chamberlin, 250 Iowa 136, 93 N.W.2d 80 (1958); Korff v. G & G Corp.,
21 N.J. 558, 122 A.2d 889 (1956); Grober v. Kahn, 76 N.J. Super. 252, 184 A.2d 161
(Ch. Div. 1962); Mueller v. Eucenham, 33 N.J. Super. 156, 109 A.2d 462 (App. Div.
1954); Eberlin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 402 Pa. 520, 167 A.2d 155 (1961); 74 HARv. L.
REv. 627 (1961).
10 See, e.g., Cannata v. White Owl Express, Inc., 839 IIl. App. 79, 89 N.E.2d 56
(1949); Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 115, 66 S.W.2d 127 (1933).
17 See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 35 Nev.
259, 129 Pac. 313 (1913); State ex rel. Spigner v. Superior Court, 175 Okla. 632, 54
P.2d 317 (1936); Livengood v. Ball, 63 Okla. 93, 162 Pac. 768 (1917).
18 Te Tiedemann case, supra note 17, is an example. See also, Russell v. Landau,
127 Cal. App. 2d 682, 274 P.2d 681 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Kirtley v. Chamberlin, 250
Iowa 136, 93 N.W.2d 80 (1958); State ex rel. Spigner v. Superior Court, supra note 17.
1 "The rule enables the nonresident to litigate his rights without fear of molesta-
tion and enables him to procure the attendance of such witnesses as are necessary for
his defense and support. See Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 292, 253 P.2d
25, 26 (1953); Halsey v. Stewart, 4 N.J.L. 426, 427 (Sup. Ct. 1817); Netograph Mfg. Co.
v. Scrugham, 197 N.Y. 377, 380, 90 N.E. 962, 963 (1910).
20 See cases cited note 19 supra and note 23 infra.
91 See, e.g., Keeffe & Roscia, supra note 4, at 473.
2 Id. at 474-75. See Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 129 (1916), where the Court
said: "'Courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interrup-
Vol. 1964:595]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
court's dignity; (3) the prevention of embarrassment and interrup-
tion of a court by a litigant's being served with process; and (4) the
promotion of the due administration of justice by the encourage-
ment of the voluntary attendance of persons necessary to the exercise
of the judicial function. Only the last of these appears to be of
confinuing importance today.23
The Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the doctrine as
having outlived its usefulness in that state.24  In the first place, the
tion, and to cast a perfect protection around every man who necessarily approaches
them. The citiien, in every claim of right which he exhibits, and every defense which
he is obliged to make, should be permitted to approach them, not only without sub-
jecting himself to evil, but even free from fear of molestation or hindrance. He
should also be enabled to procure, without difficulty, the attendance of all such
persons as are necessary to manifest his rights.'" (Quoting from Halsey v. Stewart,
4 N.J.L. 426, 427 (Sup. Ct. 1817)).
, 21Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932). This consideration seems aimed
primarily at the protection of witnesses. See Halsey v. Stewart, supra note 22, at
368-69.
The immunity rule developed at a time when physical arrest was part of the
procedure of service of process: "The arrest of a party to a suit.., being regarded as
a breach of the defendant's privilege, the usual course was to appear in the cause in
which the arrest was made, and procure a rule against the plaintiff and his attorney
to show cause why the defendant should not be discharged out of custody by reason
of his alleged privilege.:. " Greer v. Young, 120"111. 184, 188, 11 N.E. 167, 168 (1887).
It has been said that: "The concept that the due administration of justice will -be
impeded unless the necessary persons are in attendance is the sound basis upon which
the immunity doctrine arose. Where the exigencies of the judicial machinery arc
such that the presence of certain persons otherwise unobtainable is needed the
granting of privileges to secure their attendance is a logical and necessary function.
"Thus, it is everywhere recognized that witnesses from other jurisdictions are im-
mune from service of process. . . . If they do not come voluntarily, their presence
cannot be compelled; hence immunity from. suit is granted them." Keeffe & Roscia,
supra note 4, at 477-78.
21 There is no constitutional right of immunity from service of process. Application
of Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 39 N.J. Super. 33, 120 A.2d 504 (L. 1956).
Indeed, it is a privilege extended by the courts to meet certain of, their needs. Long v.
Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 83 (1934); Page Co. v. MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446, 448 (1923). In
recent years some jurisdictions have tended to confuse the privilege with some sub-
stantive right of the individual. In Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 710, 16 P.2d 741,
742 (1932), the court said: "Originally this privilege of exemption from service was
deemed a privilege of the court and not a privilege of the individual. In more recent
years, it has come to be recognized as a substantive right of the individual. It has
been frequently stated that this 'judicial' privilege exists as a matter of established
public policy and rests upon sound principles of justice and right." In a note, 5
CALn'. L. REv. 347 (1917), the writer said: "The privilege finds its basis in the very
substantive right of every man to be sued at home, a right which he is not willing
to risk by voluntarily entering another jurisdiction even to attend court."
More than one court has warned that the rule should not be extended beyond the
reason upon which it is founded but should be extended or withheld only as judicial
necessities require as determined within the discretion of the state. Lamb v. Schmitt,




court apparently felt that there is no justification for the rule's dis-
crimination in favor of nonresident litigants.25 They pointed out
that there is no longer any danger of interruption of the court by
service of process upon a litigant, for physical restraint has ceased to
constitute an element of that procedure.26 Similarly, a litigant will
seldom, if ever, be distracted by service of process in a related, or
even collateral, action.27  The court recognized that there is still
some validity to the rule insofar as it encourages the voluntary
attendance of litigants28 but held that this alone is not sufficient-to
compel the retention of the otherwise unsatisfactory doctrine. 29
An unarticulated, but apparent, reason for. the widespread, ac-
ceptance of the immunity doctrine is that in some circumstances, for
policy reasons, a court may not wish to exercise its jurisdiction in
all cases. 30 However, the inflexibility of the old rule renders it un-
satisfactory, in that it allows the court no discretion in cases in
which the protection of the state's interests demand retention of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court. found a much more-satisfactory
approach to the problem of nonresident litigant immunity by ap-
plying the more plastic principles of forum non conveniens.
Simply stated, the principle of forum non conveniens is that a
court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when the
jurisdiction is clearly authorized. 1 The doctrine presupposes at
2 "The principle of immunity allows a nonresident to defend suits in our State,
without subjecting himself to another suit, while it prevents a resident defendant
from claiming such protection. Historically, both categories of defendants would be
protected, but today the resident defendant is not." 196 A.2d at 516-17.
2" See note 23 supra.
27 196 A.2d at 517.
28 "The most persuasive argument for the immunity rule is that the privilege is
granted to encourage attendance of litigants whose appearances are necessary to the
trial of the cause. ... It is argued that unless immunity is'granted to a litigant, he
might be deterred from attending through fear of being subjected to new litigation.
Thus, the court's search for truth might be frustrated and an injustice might result."
196 A.2d at 517. See note 22 supra.
2DThe court said that the granting of immunity actually conflicts with other
important policy considerations: it denies the right of a creditor to sue his debtor
wherever he may be found; and it shifts the burden of traveling to a foreign jurisdic-
tion from the nonresident to the resident party. 196 A.2d at 517.
20 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1340
(1933); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, suprat note 4, at 1012.
811 See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 30; Barrett, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALiF. L. REV. 380 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLuM. L. Rav. 1 (1929); Braucher, The
Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. Rlv. 908, 911-18 (1947); Developments in
the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 1008-15. The doctrine has largely
been superseded in federal courts by- the 1948 adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). WpaGr,
FEDERAL CouRTs § 44, at 141 (1963).
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least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to suit 2 and
provides criteria for a choice between them. The application of the
doctrine is left to the discretion of the trial judge who must balance
private and public interests to determine the relative advantages
and obstacles to a fair trial within the jurisdiction. 3
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is well established in New
Jersey. The courts have emphasized that it is not enough that a
defendant will be inconvenienced by a trial within the state; it must
also appear that a dismissal will not result in a significant hardship
for the plaintiff.34 Dismissal will be granted only where a weighing
of all the relevant factors decisively established that there is available
another forum where trial will be more convenient for the parties
and the ends of justice will better be served. 5
82 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08. The forums which the doctrine
presupposes may well be theoretical rather than actual. For example, if a defendant
domiciled in New York is served with process in North Carolina, he is considered
amenable to suit in New York, even though the New York statute of limitations
actually may bar an action against him.
33Among the private interests to be considered are: (1) relative ease of access to
sources of proof; (2) availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling,
and the cost of obtaining the attendance of willing, witnesses; (3) possibility of a
view of the premises, if such view would be appropriate to the action; and (4)
,residence of the parties. Among the factors of public interest are: (1) the adminis-
trative burden which the case would impose upon the court; (2) the desirability of
having purely local affairs tried in the place where they arose; and (3) the desirability
of holding the trial at the place whose local law will govern the merits of the case.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 32, at 508-09. No one of these factors is con-
clusive, for in most instances it will be necessary to decide upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case at issue. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 800, 819 (1956).
But it is generally held that unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiff's choice of forum must not be disturbed. Gulf Oil Corp. V. Gilbert,
supra; Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 827-28 (10th Cir. 1963); Menendez
Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
- Starr v. Berry, 25 N.J. 573, 587, 138 A.2d 44, 51 (1958). The court pointed out
that a plaintiff's choice should not be denied on a mere weighing of conveniences. It
said the controlling test must be practicality as well as inherent justice.
Domestic residence is not decisive in the retention of jurisdiction. While it is true
that an action by a resident will ordinarily not be dismissed on the ground of in-
convenience, the court will treat an action between two nonresident parties on the
same basis-whether justice can be done as well in New Jersey as in some other forum.
Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670 (1954).
3r Gore v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 34, at 311, 104 A.2d at 675-76.
In Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 25 N.J. 293, 295, 135 A.2d 857, 858 (1957), the
court said: "Even where all of the relevant considerations of convenience in the
juristic sense point to the conclusion that an action should not be entertained in
the forum where it was instituted, collateral equities may exist in a plaintiff's favor
which should not be ignored although they may not be of sufficient potency to stand
in the way of the dismissal. In such situations the exercise of discretion may and
properly should take these factors into account by the simple device of making the
dismissal subject to appropriate terms and conditions and thus accomplishing equal
justice between the parties."
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The result reached in this case puts nonresident litigants, in the
state only for the purpose of attending trial, on an equal basis with
any other nonresident who is served with process within the state.
The approach is a means by which a state is better able to protect its
own interests. Clearly the state owes a duty to its citizens to protect
their interests, and the rule which does not permit an exercise of
discretion by the court in the particular case presented serves only
to frustrate that duty. Under the Wangler approach, however, a
court may examine the state's interest in a case before a ruling is
made on the motion to dismiss. If the court finds a state interest
which legitimately may be asserted, then jurisdiction may be re-
tained. Conversely, if the interest of the state is miniscule, whereas
retention of jurisdiction would work undue hardship on the non-
resident, the court may dismiss. From the point of view of the
state, this is considerably more advantageous than a rule which
arbitrarily granted automatic immunity to certain groups before its
courts.
Although it is clear that generally the approach adopted by the
court is advantageous to the state, the court chose a less than satis-
factory manner in which to announce the new policy. The situation
presented in the Wangler case appears to be one which called for
a prospective rather than a retrospective holding; it seems harsh to
subject a fiduciary to suit in his individual capacity after he had
entered the state thinking he would be immune.386 In any event, it
would be of significant benefit to the state to limit the new rule so
as to prevent its application to nonresident fiduciaries who are
required to enter the jurisdiction to defend suits against the estates
which they represent.3 7 The more efficient administration of estates
00 On this point, the court split. The concurring opinion said that since the
present action arose out of the original suit for which the defendant entered the
state, service of process was valid under an exception to the immunity rule. 196 A.2d
at 519.
The dissent said that the legal distinction between the executor in his representa-
tive capacity and in his individual capacity presented equitable considerations sufficient
to prevent service upon one to be valid as against the other. 196 A.2d at 520.
A.2d at 520.
It is suggested that the court could have decided this case on either of the above
rationales and was not compelled to abandon the old immunity rule so abruptly.
37 It would constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty for an executor to allow a
default judgment against the estate. ATmINSON, WILLS § 117 (2d ed. 1953). Thus
he is not free to decide whether to enter the state to defend a suit against the
estate which he represents.
If immunity is abandoned, fiduciaries who are liable for collateral actions in the
jurisdictions containing the estates which they represent may resign in order to avoid
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which would result would seem to be well worth the limited sacrifice
of discretion required of the court.
risking a suit against them personally. A new executor would have to qualify and
be appointed. This might develop into a chain reaction if the second were to become
liable and subsequently resign. The instability in the administration of estates which
might possibly result certainly would not be in the best interests of the state.
